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ABSTRACT
Since World War II, the study of pertinent data reveals
that the Soviets have an overall average lead tine in the
development of major weapons systems of five years compared
to an average of ten years for the United States. This
asymmetry between the Soviet lead time and that of the United
States requires that we concede to the present political
rival a great advantage in the efficient allocation of
resources and efforts in the field of research and development.
It is the purpose of this paper to discuss, in non-mathe-
matical terms, the causal and resultant relations which are
pertinent to the relative advantage which the Soviets appear
to have over the United States in the area of lead time in
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It has been well established as an observed fact of pres-
ent times that the Soviet Union can fully develop a new
weapons system in about five years, but that the sane rela-
tive magnitude of development would take the United States
some ten years. This gives the Soviets an apparent lead
time advantage of about fifty per cent, a figure which will
be shown to have an increasingly serious effect or. national
defense.
Certain of the important consequences of such a situation
in contemporary end future time periods are noted, and some
of the important causes for this asymmetry are certainly
worthy of discussion.
Assuming some reasonable figures and graphs of the growth
rate of technical knowledge and developmental choice space,
it can be argued that relative military power of opposing
nations will depend very much upon maintaining the minimum
possible lead time between initiation of a decision to com-
mence development of a specific weapons system framework,
and the time the weapons system is available for operational
use.
Although it is not the purpose of this paper to present
full and complete answers to the nroblems discussed on lead
time, the field of operations research is ideally suited to

a thorough study of all aspects of the problem as a whole,
and it is hoped that the discussion herein will stimulate




THE RATE OF GROWTH IN SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE
A study of data in the related fields of scientific
patents, notable scientific advances, and the number of
scientific journals over the time span of about 1700
through the present gives adequate evidence that knowledge
in the physical sciences has been growing at an exponential
rate for the past two and a half centuries.
Figure 1 gives a crude measure of the growth of world-
wide scientific knowledge, orimarily in the physical sciences,
in terr.s of increase in £he number of scientific journals.
Such growth of knowledge appears to be doubling about every
fifteen years. Similar patterns are found when utilizing




Exponential Growth Rate of Science.

It would be obviously foolish to expect that the basis
used here, the scientific journal, would accurately predict
future rate of growth of scientific knowledge, because of
the saturation feature inherent in such a medium of communi-
cation. On the other hand, there is no reason to believe
that the rate of growth of scientific knowledge itself, as
a somewhat abstract quantity, will not continue to move along
the exponential line for a time period well within the range
of discussion. In fact, a major breakthrough in the scienti-
fic community could easily have the effect of temporarily
increasing the rate above the exponential.
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ESTABLISHING THE NUMBER OF TECHNICAL CHOICES AVAILABLE AS
A MEASURE OF LEAD TIME EFFECTS
Because of the abstract qualities of scientific know-
ledge growth rate, it is advisable to find a more easily-
quantified terra related thereto.
Suppose, as an example from the field of aircraft weapons
systems, that in 1935 there existed on the order of two major
choices available to the designer of a major bomber weapons
system, and that in 1955 there existed about 360 choices
available. £2] These choices are what will be termed techni-
cal choices, ana although they are not highly definitive
quantifiers of scientific knowledge, they should logically
have some functional relationship to it, and provide a some-
what more sensible quantity for discussion.
In order to generate a functional relationship between
the amount of physical knowledge and the corresponding num-
ber of technical choices available, suppose one hypothesizes
that the upper limit of the number of choices available to
weapons systems designers will be a factorial function of
the average amount of knowledge existing at a particular
time. This choice of function represents the permutation
characteristic of major parameters of a system determined
primarily by state-of-the-art, which is in turn determined
generally by the amount of scientific knowledge for the

period in question. Furthermore, from data collected in
the specific area of aircraft weapons systems, the above
hypothesis represents a close correlation backed by the
data available.
To establish the relationship in numbers and to plot
the relationship, let N represent the amount of knowledge
and calculate the number of choices equal to factorial N,
where N doubles every fifteen years, starting arbitrarily
at N equal to two at time 1935 as a reference point. By
this calculation, it is seen that there is reasonable
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As a further (and perhaps not too irrational) assump-
tion, suppose that the above quantitative measure may be
used for a more general discussion involving all types of
weapons systems, over and above the specific field of air-
craft weapons systems from which the measure was developed.
Suppose also that such measure pertains to the Soviets as
well as to the United States. This graph can now serve to
yield some figures which point up the effects of a lead time
advantage in the development of weapons systems in relation
to the increase of scientific knowledge.
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THS EFFECT OF LEAD TIME COUPLED WITH OBSOLESCENCE
The observed fact that the Soviet Union can fully
develop a new weapon system in five years against a develop-
ment time of about ten years by the United States has been
stated and presumably accepted. Along with this, suppose
that indications, based on admittedly meager data bearing on
the problem, show that the Soviets and the United States both
follow an obsolescence policy (at least in regard to its air
attack systems) such that weapons systems have an operation-
al life of between five and seven years. [3]
In examining the effect of the disparity between lead
times in the competition between a Soviet weapons system and
a United States system (presumably one the counterweapon
of the other, in a broad sense), Figure 2 shall be used for
gathering comparative figures.
It is interesting to note that, accepting the use of
this measure of the technological choices available, new
weapons systems choices developed at such a slow rate during
the time period prior to about 1940 that management could
cope with technical progress without too much difficulty,
since there was adequate time to argue, coordinate, and choose
between those few choices then available.
Now assume that the Soviets decided on a particular
weapons system in 1955. From Figure 2, it is noted that at

that time there were about 200 choices available. Assume
further that not until 1957 i because of the lag in the
field of intelligence, did the United States become aware
in a somewhat uncertain way of the probable characteristics
of the forthcoming Soviet weapons system, which was scheduled
to become operational some five years later in I960. Then
suppose that the United States in 1957 made a decision to
counter this new Soviet weapons system by some counterweapons
system of conparible development magnitude. At this time,
according to Figure 2, there are some 500 technical choices
available, against only 200 for the Soviets in 1955, thus
apparently giving the United States an advantage in this
respect. However, with a ten-year lead time, the United
States cannot have the counterweapons system fully operation-
al until 1967, some seven years after the Soviet capability
first became operational.
The real disadvantage arises, however, when the question
of weapons system lifetime or obsolescence is studied. The
average lifetime of the Soviet weapons system made operation-
al in I960 will be phased out and replaced between I965 and
1967 by a new weapons system based upon I960 technology
represented by its 5000 choices available. On the other
hand, the United States is faced with countering this new
and superior Soviet weapons system in 1965-1967 with the
same counterweapons system developed from the technology
of 1957, with its 500 choices available. Thus the United

States counter system could very well indeed be completely
ineffective, having come into operational being against a
technologically superior system.
Admittedly, the example given is an extreme one, not
allowing for the many transient conditions which can and do
generally improve the situation so that it does not seem
quite so hopeless. It is perhaps clear, however, that the
conflict between offense and defense can be maintained at
some semblance of equality only if there are no more than a
few months lag between between decisions on weapons and
counterweapons systems, and if the lead time in development
by the United States is at the very least equal to that of
the Soviets. To maintain such parity, on the basis of equal
lead time, requires the additional factor of a solid fore-
cast of the Soviet's probable future course of action. This
forecast, based principally on intelligence, must not only
determine Soviet decisions at the earliest possible dates,
but must also be the basis of the actual decisions on the
appropriate counterweapons system to be employed.
Because war can now be decided in days instead of years,
an important aspect of relative military power seems to be
dependence upon maintaining the minimum possible lead time
between the time when a developmental decision is made and
the time a weapons system is made fully operational.
10

FACTORS INFLUENCING LONG LEAD TIKES IN THE UNITED STATES
At the present time, military research and development
in the United States is carried out within a system whose
two major components are industry and the Department of
Defense. Because the military part of this system has
relatively few government owned-and-operated laboratories
that do creative work in the research and development field,
the burden of such work is borne by industry, commonly
referred to as defense industry when used in connection with
military contractual work:
In theory, at least, the guidance and management under
which defense industry must work in the overall defense
effort comes from the military officers of the Department of
Defense, whereas civilians with military research and develop-
ment experience have, for all practical purposes, no real
responsibility and authority for military research and
development programs reflected in the Department of Defense.
Herein lies a key factor in weapons system development
which contributes to long lead times. The following specific
problems stem either directly or indirectly from the gap
created between the military and defense industry, and lead
to the wasteful expenditure of time and effort, with associ-
ated costs, in the overall plan of weapons development. It
must be recognized, of course, that there are overlapping
11

causal relationships between some of these problem areas,
and that solutions to one problem could very well render




Defense industry is presently organized in such a way
that survival in the area of development--in fact, survival
as individual companies—requires that profit stem primarily
from production contracts that follow successful develop-
ment . This in turn means that the company dealing in weapons
development will tend to choose and process developments
that have a very high probability of being successful, since
successful development contracts lead to the real profit-
making and life-giving production contracts. However, in
order to obtain such high probability Of success in the
development field, the company is forced to abandon more
original (but high-risk) development programs in favor of the
simpler and less risky route of product improvement. Such
routes tend to yield, stemming from our present industrial-
military partnership, slow and steady and often mediocre
progress.
Directly connected with this problem area is another
requirement of industry. Since active industrial develop-
ment organizations can and do lead to profit-making production
contracts, some assurance must be established that steady
employment for scientists and engineers exist within these
development Organizations. Because it takes approximately
two years for a new employee in a company to become fully
produetive [If"] (except , of course, in special cases of special-
ized requirements or transfer within the field of development),
13

it becomes impractical to hire and discharge research and
development people on a short-term basis and still retain
the competence level necessary for successful development.
Since a steady work-load can assure long-term employment,
and in turn is assured by a reserve of development projects
to be completed, industry is inclined to stretch the develop-
ment time for each project to some degree, thereby length-
ening over-all lead time. In the "crisis" of no backlog of
development contracts, the work program on the current contract
is more drastically stretched while a frantic search is made
for new contracts that will insure survival of the develop-
ment laboratory.
The solution to this area of the over-all problem of
lead time could come from a lesson learned during World War
II. During that period, in which the United States was
required to and did develop weapons systems in acceptably
short lead times, one factor stood out: most of the great
weapons systems were developed in systems laboratories which
were independent of production control or facilities. This
was true of weapons development within Germany and Great
Britain as well. Thus, every laboratory was treated as though
it were a facility, and there was no difficult tie-in be-
tween development and production, at least from the profit
point of view. Furthermore, all indications within the realm
of intelligence show that the Soviets are presently using
just this principle of separating development from production
14

as one factor in achieving a lower lead time than the United




Defense industry is presently being compensated for
successful fulfillment of its development contracts by the
total cost of such development plus an additional fee regu-
lated by and dependent upon this total cost. [4] These are
known as cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts, and have resulted in
contributing two principle effects to lead time. Since the
fee is a function of the total cost of development, it is
to the company's advantage to squeeze out the maximum possi-
ble profit by using an extravegant number of personnel,
particularly those technically trained, to boost the total
cost and thereby the fee. Hence there is no incentive to-
wards the economical use of scientific and engineering per-
sonnel. Secondly, the cost-plus-fixed-fee contract presents
no particular immediate reward for success or punishment for
failure, and therefore industry has no incentive to take a
high risk associated with originality of weapons development
which, under different circumstances, might yield high profit
as its reward.
An obvious solution to this problem is to change the
method of compensation for successful completion of defense
development contracts. The present arrangement is obviously
an attempt at some sort of compromise between high rewarding
incentives for high ouality work, and high penalties for poor
quality work. This compromise appears very weak at its best.
Suppose, then, as a companion to the separation of the develop-
16

ment phase of building weapons systems from the production
phase, a new method of contract compensation be instigated,
whereby the motivation for industry to "pad" the personnel
roster in order to boost the fee or profit is virtually eli-
minated. Contractual arrangements would be made which pro-
vide assurance of maintenance of the development organization
over a reasonably long period, say three to five years,
thereby having the effect of actuating the idea of a facili-
ty with its attendant defense support. The primary motiva-
tion for producing superior development work, therefore, would
shift to fulfilling the requirement that the contract would
be extended each year, provided that performance remained good.
On the other hand, poor performance would be penalized by
non-extension of the contract, but would allow a buffer period
consisting of the remaining years of the original contract
in which to exhibit improvement and achieve higher and more
acceptable standards in end results.
An accompanying change in the actual monetary remunera-
tion system would provide for a graduated profit scale which
should perhaps result in no profit for poor performance and
range to very high profit for excellent performance. In
fact, the profits for excellent performance should be so
high that it would stimulate industrial organizations to
compete for the establishment of research and development
facilities because of the intrinsic profit in development
as an industry. Organizational efficiency would offset a
17

possible increase in the defense budget due solely to






Perhaps the most serious agent contributing to long lead
time is the general field of information communication between
industry and the military, and between units of industry
itself. Inherent in this problem, and a prime reason for
the problem in the first place, is the military requirement
of M need-to-known regarding all classified information.
This requirement originally came about as a barrier to the
indiscriminate perusal of classified material by holders
of security clearances, merely because the security clearance
was held and could serve as a passkey to classified informa-
tion, and regardless of wnether or not it was needed by the
holder in his official capacity. The reasoning behind the
regulation of need-to-know was, of course, that the less
classified information was distributed, the less chance there
was that such information would leak to unauthorized persons.
Unfortunately, although the principle behind the regula-
tion is quite sound, the restrictions it imposes on the field
of research and development is serious enough to warrant the
greatest and most timely consideration. From personal obser-
vation, one industrial research and development organization
recently was moved to the point of volunteering an expensive
and time consuming development study for the single remunera-
tion of increasing its knowledge from the classified infor-
mation held by the military, heretofore denied this organi-
zation because of the failure to fulfill the requirement of
19

need-to-know. Certainly such a study was not a complete waste
of time and effort by the company, nor valueless to the mili-
tary when completed, but the conditions under which the effort
was initiated surely points out the desperation which indus-
try feels along the line of information communication as it
presently exists.
Security regulations involving need-to-know are thus so
rigidly enforced that not only is industry unable to make
proposals based upon the most forward-looking aspects of
tactical and strategic requirements, but also industry does
not, in general, have adequate access to the tremendous
amount of prior or parallel work of other industrial or mili-
tary laboratories. As a result, the classified libraries
of industry are inadequate relative to their need for classi-
fied information. The fault appears to lie with those mili-
tary managers who do not understand the need for a broad
spectrum of information in achieving real, valuable research
and development. These managers, in general not having had
the experience of wading through thorough development back-
ground material, seem to lack appreciation of the fact that
need-to-know cannot be rigidly limited or interpreted when
the problem is one of search for information, the value of
which cannot be appreciated until it is found.
This particular security regulation leads directly,
through limited communications within the Department of Defense
itself, to unnecessary duplication of work and effort already
20

done. The primary cause of this dilemma appears to be the
present interservice barriers set up by long time rivalry
between the services, which has unfortunately carried over
into the vital realm of national defense, and in particular
the interservice competition for superior weapons systems.
Thus, the major service branches call upon the need-to-know
rule particularly when it tends to suit the security aspect
of a pet service project. The amount of information which
is suppressed to within a relatively small realm of knowledge-
able people is staggering when it is thought of in terms of
its potential in new research and development to cut time
and cost in reaching final weapons system outputs.
Yet another aspect in the field of information communi-
cations is what is known as proprietary information. Infor-
mation included. in this category forms a vast field of know-
ledge which the individual 'research and development organi-
zation, originating such knowledge (mainly in the form of
reports), deems necessary to secure against leakage to other
competitive industrial organizations. Proprietary information,
therefore, falls into the same general category as need-to-
know information, since distribution of this knowledge is
quite as limited as is military classified information. Of
course, the effect is again to increase development time
merely for the doubtful advantage of limiting the resources
of competitors in industry. Industry attempts to compensate




to defense and industrial installations. This is a poor
method of obtaining necessary information which is either
classified by the military or withheld by industry, and wastes
technical manpower and, above all, extends development lead
time.
The problem that lies herein is most complex. Tied into
it are some of the basic principles of free enterprise, coupled
with military requirements designed to strengthen the safety
and welfare of the people of our free society. The very
principles which guarantee the rights of individuals appear
to allow a condition to arise whereby the process of national
defense is impaired on a grand scale.
Also tied into the major problem at hand is the related
field of information retrieval, which does not necessarily
involve deliberate distribution limitations, but is in itself
a subject for intense study and might conceivably hold a key
to the answer of the communication information problem.
One thing is clear, however. A major revision of infor-
mation communications must be undertaken in order that research
and development may procede in the proper perspective and with





It has been pointed out that the effect of the increase
in physical knowledge at an exponential rate, coupled with
the present relationship between defense industry and the
military managers in the research and development of weapons
systems, has led the United States into an unfavorable situ-
ation with its political rival, the Soviet Union. Because
of a number of related factors, there exists at present be-
tween the two countries a fifty percent discreoancy in the
amount of time required tq develop a major weapons system
(or its counter), to the disadvantage of the United States.
It does not appear that the situation can become any
more favorable for the United States until positive steps
are undertaken to correct certain practices involving organi-
zation, compensation, and information communications that
appear to be producing this unsatisfactory situation, and
which can only be corrected through grand scale study of
these problems and their interrelationships. In summary,
the solutions to these problems appear to lie primarily in
providing the incentive for speed and quality in rrilitary
research by industry by:
a, Removal of the bond between development and production
contracts.
b. Replacement of the cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts by
23

sliding scales of profit based on excellence of performance.
c. Provision for partially breaking the security barrier
to the point where research and development is not stifled
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